The principles of protective measures laid down by Sir Thomas Legge (1934) are now widely accepted. The primary responsibility for protection lies with the people who plan the work. Built-in shielding, total or partial enclosure of processes, ventilating systems with general or local exhaust are examples of the type of protection, external to the worker and over which he can exercise no control, which Legge regarded as being of primary importance. The recent rapid progress in nuclear physics with the development of piles, cyclotrons, betatrons and other high energy generators, together with the increasing availability of radioactive isotopes, increased the potential hazards to health from radiations and radioactive substances, including active dusts and gases. Protective measures must keep in step with the new developments. For high voltage X-rays or other high energy radiation the protective measures differ quantitatively rather than qualitatively from those with less powerful machines. Distance and shielding are the two most important factors. The extremely small amounts of radioactive dust and gases which are permissible in the air of a room call for ventilating systems of high efficiency.
Examples of protective measures which, according to Legge, are only partially Nov.-RADIOL. 1 successful because they depend on the will or whim of the worker to use them are protective clothing, eyeshields and respirators. Education of the workers in the nature of the hiealth hazards is essential. Physicians charged with their health protection may need to use a great deal of tact and persuasion to enlist the co-operation of staff in their own health safety. Distance is the best and easiest form of protection: the staff should know the inverse square law for decrease of intensity of gamma rays with distance from the source; the range of beta particles and the rapid decrease with distance of beta radiation. Distance cannot always be used, so shielding is necessary. Even though beta particles of average energies are stopped by a few millimetres of glass-about 3 mm. in the case of radiophosphorus-it is still a good rule to use tongs or forceps with highly beta active solutions. Present-day glassware is often thin and a considerable amount of the radiation will get through, so that handling with bare hands should be avoided. Rubber gloves or paper should be used when handling beta-active materials. Spills on clothing, if allowed to dry and come in contact with skin, may cause injury. Low Beer (1946) has shown that 34 microcuries of radiophosphorus applied to one square centimetre of skin for one hour gives a perceptible erythema. It is not safe to allow a continual skin contamination over long periods of time of more than a few hundred counts per minute of typical beta ray activity.
The gamma radiation from most isotopes will be absorbed by about 2 in. of lead in the majority of cases-though in the more energetic gamma rays, such as those of Na24, about 10% would penetrate this shield.
Good housekeeping is essential. Spills are dangerous. Spills of solutions will dry and the active dust will be disseminated through the air of the room on to floors and benches and possibly into adjacent rooms also. A glass vessel must be placed inside a second container or tray. It is a good rule to work inside stainless steel trays, and to keep special trays lined with absorbent paper for tubes, pipettes and stirring rods, and to make it a rule never to place them on the laboratory bench after use (M.R.C., 1949). If the working conditions are bad, a few millicuries may be potentially more harmful than 1,000 curies under proper working conditions. To limit airborne activity, experiments with dry materials, or those giving off gases or vapour, should be carried out in an airtight dry box or in a fume cupboard. Dust must not be allowed to collect, and walls, floors, benches must be easy to clean and free from cracks or crevices where dust can lodge. Waxed linoleum is a good floor covering, walls should be plastered and coated with a hard gloss or strippable paint. Laboratory benches and fume cupboards should be made of or covered with glass or stainless steel. A wooden laboratory bench is liable to absorb radioactivity in case of a spill-if wood is used, painting with a hard gloss paint is advisable. Protective clothing, including gloves, coveralls or laboratory coats and possibly a change of shoes should be provided and worn, with rooms for washing and changing. The scrupulous care, cleanliness and discipline of a bacteriological laboratory should be observed.
Constant checking of conditions is essential, and a small portable monitoring instrument should always be at hand. Unsuspected leakage and scattered radiation may be hazardous. It is not safe to assume that a bench or table-top affords sufficient protection. A thin brick wall or a partition, floor or ceiling may not be sufficient protection for the unsuspecting occupants of contiguous rooms: there are six sides to a room. The monitoring should be continual: unsuspected leakages in shielding scattered radiation will only be detected if this is done. Area monitoring must also include estimations of the amount of active dusts and gases in the air of the rooms.
The maintenance of the health of the workers is the final and acid test of the efficiency of the planning procedures and working conditions. But the results cannot 924 be given either quickly or easily. It is essential to attempt to detect radiation damage as quickly as possible and to prevent further damage from occurring. Any clinical test should give reliable information about the individual, but this means assessing individual radiosensitivity. It is not uncommon for doses varying by a factor of 2, even up to a factor of 5, to produce a given biological effect in different individuals. Clinically the normal base line of the health of each individual worker must be established, so that any significant deviation from this base line can be noted. The quantitative measure of occupational exposure is helpful in assessing the probability of occupational exposure as the causative factor of deviation from normal. A pre-employment or pre-exposure medical examination is of importance in establishing the normal of the individual. This includes a full history, personal and occupational; history of previous radiation exposure, including screening for diagnostic purposes; clinical examination; blood-count and X-ray of chest. Condition of skin, nails and eyes should be noted. This is followed by routine follow-up examinations during exposure.
Examination of the circulating blood has long been recognized to be of value in the clinical assessment of occupational over-exposure to radiation. Characteristic changes in blood-counts occur frequently but individual variation is very great. As an indication of early damage, the blood-count is one of the fairly satisfactory types of evidence, but it is becoming increasingly evident that the classical hematological methods are not sufficiently sensitive. It is recommended that a base line should be established by taking two or three counts several days apart before exposure, at the same time of day (to exclude diurnal variation). Other possible factors influencing the count should be noted, including chemical laboratory reagents such as benzene and the sulphonamide and amidopyrine drugs used therapeutically.
Most previous work has been devoted to changes in the numbers of cells of different types. Although immediately after therapeutic radium implantation or surface application there is frequently a rise in the absolute number of neutrophil leucocytes in the circulating blood, the lymphocytes usually show a rapid and progressive decrease in numbers. With occupational over-exposure, there is frequently leucopenia due to neutropenia and certain individuals exhibit an absolute lymphocytosis. Jacobson (1947) considers a lymphopenia the most sensitive indication of radiation damage. Goodfellow (1935) has shown that "the appearance of embryonic white cells in the blood has coincided with such occasions of excessive exposure which leaves no doubt, if indeed there could be any, that irradiations were responsible for such definite departures from the normal". "In the majority of instances the abnormal cells observed have been Turk cells." "On several occasions other forms of atypical lymphocytes were seen. These were more normal in general appearance, but the cytoplasm contained minute eosinophilic granules. Less frequently monocytes exhibiting similar changes have made their appearance at times when the individuals concerned had a low white cell count" (1936).
Dickie and Hempelmann (1947) have described also a greater increase in the number of abnormal leucocytes containing neutral red bodies, demonstrated by a supravital technique, in workers exposed to radiation in the tolerance range than in workers exposed to chemical toxins. Nearly all the individuals exposed to gamma rays of less than 0-1 r/day had more than 20%, but only about one-third of the individuals exposed to chemical toxins had more than 20%. Browning (1949) has found large abnormal monocytes with pyknotic nucleus and granular cytoplasm in luminizersthese disappear from the blood picture after a period of non-exposure.
Dickie and Hempelmann (1947) have shown that the mean leucocyte count of a group of individuals exposed to a daily dose of radiation of probably less than 0 1 r was lower than that of a similar group of normal unexposed persons. Such a finding should focus attention on the working environment of such a group and statistical comparison has been recommended as a reasonably accurate diagnostic procedure (Cronkite, 1949) .
At present we do not know what significance to attach to these findings. It is not easy to decide at what point it is prudent to advise that any particular individual should cease to have exposure temporarily or permanently. A study of cytological abnormalities of the leucocytes of the circulating blood using the quantitative method of ultraviolet photomicrography, by which, in a series of papers (1940, 1942, 1943 and 1944 ), Mitchell has demonstrated disturbances of the cellular nucleic-acid metabolism, offers a promising avenue of approach.
Laboratory tests by biochemical and counting methods form an essential part of the clinical investigations. Essentially these are tests of excretion of internally deposited radioactive materials. With radioactive isotopes we are not as fortunate as in the case of radium and radon which have certain physical and radioactive properties which can be used for testing internal deposition: radon in breath, and Ra as RaC can be detected by external gamma radiation. With radio-iodine the localized emission from the thyroid gland can be measured, but only very rarely can general gamma emission be used: it would be possible with Na24. So, in general, the method used is to concentrate the radioactive material from urine-preferably a twenty-fourhour specimen-and estimate the amount present. With uranium we use the property that, fused with sodium fluoride, fluoresces in ultraviolet light (Stone, 1946) . The method is sensitive-in our workers, the excretion is less than 5 microgrammes per litre of urine.
Beta counting (by Geiger-Muller counters or ionization chambers) is used for the more generally available isotopes. In general, it will be advisable to make some separation from inert matter.
The aim is to estimate the amount retained in the body, and it is possible to make a fairly reasonable guess. But as our assumptions on the rate of excretion are based on the results of animal experiments, the results are not precise quantitative values. We are specially concerned to determine whether any slow accumulation of repeated small doses is taking place, in particular, with long-lived radioactive materials believed to have a low excretion. The method is also used to get as good a figure as possible for the intake in an accidental happening.
When radioactive isotopes become more generally available and are used in hospitals for research purposes or as therapeutic agents, protective measures of greater or lesser extent will be needed. It may be advisable to consider possible hazards to the nursing and technical staff who will handle the urine and stools in which the radioactive material is excreted: and even potential hazards to the occupants of adjacent beds. Random handling throughout the hospital is likely to lead to a spread of contamination. Probably it would be an advantage to have a special reception or preparation room where radioactive isotopes could be received and prepared for administration; special storage space for sources; equipment, glassware and syringes used for radioisotopes specially marked and not used elsewhere in the hospital. Howarth (1948) considers isotope work to be totally unsuited to the general clinical laboratory of a hospital.
Adsorption of active material on glass is not uncommon, so, even after washing, the glassware should not be mixed with new items and should be segregated after use. Possibly it will be found an advantage to set aside a separate room or wing of the building for therapy with radioactive isotopes. The laboratory staff concerned in the preparation of injections and estimations of amounts excreted must be trained to observe the necessary precautions and should be under medical supervision. 926 
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Attention has been drawn to the risks of radioactive isotopes (Brit. med. J., 1947) and Mitchell (1947) and Howarth (1948) have stated the need for caution. It is important to avoid the possible danger of carcinogenesis which might result from the introduction of radioactive materials, including p32 and I131, into the body and also the possible effect on spermatogenesis and oogenesis in young persons (McWhirter, 1947) . The conclusion is drawn that in the present state of knowledge it is in general unwise to use p32 to treat patients who are in the reproductive period of life or who have an expectation of life of five years or more (Brit. med. J., 1947).
Provided suitable protective measures are taken in handling radioactive isotopes and discretion is exercised in their use for therapeutic purposes, safe conditions can be achieved. At Harwell it has been possible to keep the average weekly exposure of staff working with ionizing radiation or radioactive substances to less than 1/10 of a roentgen a week since the Establishment began. No ill-effects on health have been observed. INTRODUCTION Almost immediately following the actual discoveries of X-rays and of the naturally occurring radioactive isotopes, instances occurred of radiation injury and it was very quickly obvious that protective measures would have to be adopted in the development and application of these discoveries. In the early work the measures were largely corrective and were applied following the instances of over-exposure, but nowadays sufficient is known for precautions to be taken in advance and the methods are accordingly preventative. The large increase in the use of radioactive materials and of radiotherapy has led to considerable numbers of persons being exposed to radiation hazard and has necessitated the development of the special branch of applied physics known as Health Physics. A further reason for this has been the necessity, in the development of atomic energy, of carrying out work with radioactive materials on a factory scale where large numbers of non-professional persons are exposed to radiation hazards: in these circumstances a considerable organization is necessary which, on the research scale, can usually be dispensed with.
GENERAL NATURE OF HAZARDS AND THE BASIS OF PROTECTION
It is generally believed that the hazard from inhalation and ingestion of radioactive materials is much more serious than that from external radiation, largely because of the difficulty of knowing when exposure has occurred and when material has, in fact, been takei into the body. The further hazards which arise from the various kinds of external radiation include, in a large institution such as the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell, not only alpha, beta and gamma rays from radioactive materials but also hard gamma rays and neutrons of various energies produced by the piles, Van der Graaf generators and the large cyclotron.
Protection is normally achieved by defining a permissible maximum exposure or tolerance for a particular kind of radiation or for a given radioactive isotope, as a result of specific animal experiments or from the effect upon human beings of high doses of radiation in radiotherapy work or from accidental exposure to high doses; a particular instance of the latter is the series of cases of accidental over-exposure during the first World War which has yie!ded such valuable information in relation to the radium tolerance for human beings. When a tolerance has been defined it is generally possible to assess the hazard by measurement of some physical quantity such as the intensity of the radiation or the concentration of the radioactive isotope.
In order to ensure protection it is thus necessary to measure the radiobiological dose experienced by personnel due to external beta and gamma rays and neutrons of all energies: measurements have also to be made of the activity of radioactive dust which might get into the air. It is also necessary to arrange for effective control of hazards from the disposal of radioactive waste materials and from local accumulations of active gases and dust. Hazard control also involves the proper design of laboratories and plant to avoid persistent contamination and exposure, and the preparation of protection manuals and the necessary education of new staff. If the dosage experienced is to be kept down, considerable attention must be paid to the proper design of shields for apparatus containing radioactive sources and also for any high energy machines. Appropriate values for necessary shielding for beta radiation and for gamma radiation and the detailed protection procedure may be obtained by reference to the two manuals which have been made available by the Medical Research Council, namely the "Recommendations of the British X-ray and Radium Protection Committee" and the "Introductory Manual for the Control of Health Hazards from Radioactive Materials." In any laboratory where high energy radiation or radioactive isotopes are used, it is desirable that one person, usually a physicist, should be made responsible for all protection arrangements and that he should work in close collaboration with a qualified medical adviser. The Health Supervisor should be responsible for drawing up rules and regulations relating to the conduct of work and also for organizing the monitoring and other protection procedures outlined above. The Health Supervisor should also arrange for regular blood counts to be taken for all persons likely to be exposed to radiation and for an analysis of the results by a pathologist acquainted with the h2ematological effects of exposure to radiation [1] . Arrangements should also be made for periodical medical examination of all staff involved and, in particular, that their hands are frequently examined by an expert.
It will be seen that adequate radiation hazard control of a large establishment involves a wide range of technology and an extensive organization. Precautions in this work are expensive, but perhaps not nearly so expensive as the consequences of failure.
THE MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE (TOLERANCE) DOSE
Consideration will now be given to the evaluation of the maximum permissible dose of radiation and of exposure to radioactive isotopes which can be continued indefinitely without discernible effect on the body. External radiation.-In 1931, a League of Nations publication by Wintz and Rump [2] concluded that the permissible exposure was 10-5 roentgen/second, assuming a 928 Section of Radiology seven-hour working day and 300 working days per year. This is equivalent to 0-25 roentgen/day, but for persons exposed to non-intermittent sources the report recommended that the figure should be reduced by a factor of 3. The figure of 0-2 roentgen/ day was subsequently adopted by the International Committee on X-ray and Radium Protection and still remains in the International recommendations [3] ; the limit of 0-1 roentgen/day has, however, become widely established in atomic energy establishments during the war. After reviewing the results of a wide range of biological experiments and experience with X-rays and gamma rays, the Protection Sub-Committee of the British Medical Research Council recommended [4] in 1948 the adoption of 0-5 roentgen/week as the maximum permissible exposure to X or gamma radiation which may be continued over an indefinite period. In work with radioactive isotopes, no tissue or organ of the body should accordingly receive more than this or the equivalent quantity, 0 5 rep', of beta radiation, in one week, except for the hands which may receive up to 15 rep per week. It is, however, advisable [5, 6] to strive for the lowest possible exposure in every operation and the average exposure should be kept well below the limiting figure.
Whilst the maximum permissible exposure for the beta and gamma rays from radioactive isotopes is 0 5 rep/week, it has been recommended that the tolerance for alpha particles should be one-tenth of this, to allow for the higher specific ionization along the particle tracks and the increase in damage produced. The mechanism of damage in fast neutron irradiation is complicated by the recoil of protons and by the energy released in the capture of neutrons in nitrogen. In view of numerous experiments and calculations [7, 8] on this subject, it appears that the maximum permissible dose of neutrons received in one week should not exceed about onetwentieth of that for X and gamma rays when measured physically (i.e. in rep).
Internal radiation.-A great deal of experimental work has been done during the war upon the effect of inhaled and ingested radioactive isotopes upon animals and it appears that the most dangerous isotopes are probably those which, like radium, are deposited in the skeleton [9] . As a result of considerable experience with radium poisoning in man, it is now generally agreed that for persons subject to monitoring control the maximum permissible body burden of radium is 0a I microgram. By means of animal experiments, Brues [10] has determined the relative toxicity of Sr89 and Ra from which it appears that the maximum permissible human body burden of Sr89 is probably about 1 microcurie. From these basic data, it is possible to compute tolerances for a number of similar isotopes and equivalent quantities for other isotopes can be computed in a similar way, taking into account the nature of the radiation and the metabolic processes, such as absorption, excretion, location and translocation in the body.
THE MEASUREMENT OF RADIATION INTENSITY AND DOSAGE
Once a tolerance has been defined for a given type of radiation or radioactive isotope, protection depends upon measurement of the dose-rate for the radiation or of the concentration of the isotope, and it is essential that sufficient and suitable instruments are provided for this purpose. A wide range of measuring instruments is now commercially available for personnel monitoring, area monitoring, doseintegration and a number of ancillary purposes such as the measurement of the contamination on the hands or the pollution of the air of the laboratory with radio-"The roentgen-equivalent physical (rep), introduced by H. M. Parker, is the radiological dose produced in tissue by radiation other than X-rays or gamma rays, which produces the same energy absorption in tissue as 1 roentgen of X-rays or gamma rays. The energy absorption for 1 roentgen of X-rays or gamma rays is 83-8 erg/g. of air or 93-1 erg/g. of water. Since tissue and water have very similar characteristics in this respect, a dose of 1 rep thus corresponds to an energy absorption of 93-1 erg/g. in tissue. active dusts, but the measurement of fast neutron intensities in the presence of gamma rays still involves complicated physical measurements and simple equipment has not yet been devised.
Personnel monitoring.-The film badge containing a small piece of X-ray film, part covered by 1 mm. of lead, forms a convenient permanent record of the exposure of a given individual to X, beta and gamma radiation, and should be considered as an essential requirement in every institution: an appropriate film-badge service is available from the National Physical Laboratory, Teddington. It is now possible also to use film badges for the measurement of the dosage from slow neutrons by the use of loaded emulsions containing lithium or boron, whilst fast neutrons can also be estimated from the hydrogen recoils in suitable emulsions, the estimation in these instances being made by track counting. Persons engaged with appreciable quantities (say millicuries of radioactive material) or who are moving around in areas where the radiation dose-rate is not readily predictable should carry pocket ionization chambers which can be quickly read and give an immediate indication of the gammaray dose received in any given operation.
Apparatus should also be provided in all laboratories where active material is manipulated so that persons can check their degree of personal contamination at the conclusion of any given operation. It is customary in atomic energy plants such as Harwell to provide hand, foot and clothing monitors in the wash rooms associated with active laboratories. Fig. 1 shows such an instrument being used to check con-Crown copyright reserved. Sectt;on of Radiology activity handled are in the region of millicuries or greater, to have portable electronic dose-rate meters and a convenient instrument of this type is shown in fig. 2 . Mains operated monitors mounted on the bench and provided with a probe incorporating a Geiger-Muller counter are also exceedingly convenient for the control of contamination in the laboratory and a model used at Harwell is shown in fig. 3 : it has two probes, Crown copyright reserved.
Fib. 2.-Pistol-grip type of ionization chamber electronic dose-rate meter.
one (in the clip on top) for beta-gamma measurement and the other (on the bench in front) for alpha measurements. It should be noted, however, that Geiger counters have some limitation when used for the measurement of dose-rate and for this purpose ionization chambers are to be preferred. In laboratories where work is carried out continuously with radioactive material, it is also convenient to have an integrating dose-meter which measures the total dose received since the beginning of operations on any given day and indicates this on a clearly read dial in the laboratory. Such an instrument can frequently be provided with an alarm if the dose-rate becomes very high or if the total dose received since the beginning of the day rises above a certain specified value. Further details of the area instruments mentioned are being published [11] and particulars of their commercial availability may be obtained from A.E.R.E., Harwell. A further aspect of area monitoring is the measurement of neutron fluxes in the vicinity of piles, cyclotrons, and Van der Graaf gencrators. It is necessary to distinguish between fast neutrons and slow neutrons, the fluxes of the former being measured by ionization produced by the recoil of protons in a high-pressure hydrogenfilled ionization chamber, and the latter by an ionization measurement in a chamber filled with boron trifluoride. Since fast neutron fluxes are usually associated with an appreciable gamma-ray background, it is usually necessary to compensate for the ionization produced by the gamma-rays by taking subsidiary measurements with a similar ionization chamber filled with argon. Where the measurements have to be extended up to energies of the order of 200 MeV, very great difficulties are encountered and a completely satisfactory method of measurement has not yet been developed.
Air-contamination monitoring.-Many betaand alpha-active isotopes, especially those which are selectively deposited in a particular organ, such as the skeleton [9] , can give rise to a considerable hazard through ingestion or inhalation and this must be guarded against by the use of efficient hoods and by systematic monitoring of the air for active dust and aerosols. Monitoring is normally carried out by drawing a considerable volume of air through a filter paper and counting the alpha or beta activity collected, due allowance being made for radon and thoron decay products which will also be collected.
SPECIFIC HAZARDS OF PHYSICS AREAS The more hazardous radiations encountered specifically in physics areas include hard gamma rays, hard X-rays and fast neutrons. In general, these radiations arise from fixed sources, such as piles, cyclotrons or Van der Graaf generators and the radiation experienced is substantially constant and does not vary from day to day; its intensity depends essentially upon the design of the shielding and it is often possible to survey these machines and then to ensure that the circumstances do not change appreciably following the survey. The measurement of radiobiological dose for very high energy neutrons from the cyclotron presents considerable difficulties to which reference has been made above. Recent clinical cases of damage to the eyes of cyclotron workers from excessive fast neutron exposure have focused attention on this particular hazard but there appears to be no reason to make any change in the present fast neutron tolerance [7] as a consequence of these instances involving high exposures.
Neutron hazards also arise from the operation of the piles: it is necessary, for instance, to guard against exposure to neutron beams coming from holes in the pile shield, uncovered for experimental purposes: a rigid operational procedure is necessary and, in addition, a watch is kept on the slow neutron background indicated by the boron trifluoride-filled ionization chambers installed locally.
SPECIFIC HAZARDS OF THE CHEMISTRY AREAS
The main problem in chemistry areas is the prevention of contamination of the laboratory benches, fume hoods and floor and also of the air due either to normal operations or as a result of carelessness. The provision of suitable monitors, especially those of the type shown in fig. 3 , together with ceaseless vigilance, is essential to prevent the build-up of contamination. Some control can also be effected by limiting the quantities of active material which may be handled in any given laboratory, the amount depending on the design of the laboratory and equipment. The provision of well-designed remote handling devices can generally reduce the dosage very considerably and it is desirable to have one or two people who specialize in the design of quite complicated mechanisms for use in routine operations to avoid the necessity or temptation for the hands to be brought near to the active source. An example of such a piece of equipment is the device shown in fig. 4 for handling isotope containers on removal from the pile. Good design of apparatus can also reduce the exposure experienced in the handling of strong sources, especially of beta-active isotopes where it is often desirable to build the apparatus on the back of a transparent plastic shield with all the taps and controls brought through. In all active chemical laboratories it is essential to wear special laboratory clothing and this should be worn only in the active laboratories. Rubber gloves should always be worn in all operations with open sources of radioactive material. DISPOSAL OF ACTIVE WASTE In order to prevent hazards arising from the accumulation of activities in waste systems and to safeguard drinking water supplies, great care is necessary in the disposal of radioactive wastes. As far as possible active material should be precipitated from solution and disposed of as an insoluble residue. Small quantities of beta-gamma isotopes may, however, be disposed of in alkaline solution by washing down a normal sewage system; the quantities which may be disposed of in this way are, however, very strictly limited and reference is made to these in the M.R.C. Manual on the handling of radioactive materials to which reference is made above. The Manual also indicates the procedure for disposal of contaminated glass and on other solid waste. Animal remains should, in general, be passed through an incinerator in which provision has been made for filtering out any active dust which might arise in the incineration process and the ash from the incinerator should be treated as other radioactive solid waste from the laboratory. With simple precautions of this nature, radioactive work in laboratories can be carried out without danger of the spread of contamination and without hazard arising to the local population. ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
